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RECENT DECISIONS

fendant was presumed to have known of the dangerous condition, since the trap
door was located where it normally would not be opened except by the defendant
or his agents of whose acts he was charged with notice.
GEORGE J. MANGAN.
Torts-Right of Privacy-Unauthorized Radio Dramatization of Shooting.Plaintiff, a chauffeur, was held up and shot. He received a severe nervous
shock as a result, and mere mention of the shooting caused him acute nervous
attacks. Defendant dramatized the incident over the radio. On hearing the broadcast plaintiff suffered mental anguish which was aggravated by friends who
wished to discuss the occurrence with him. As a result, plaintiff's mental and
physical condition were such that he was unable to drive an automobile with
safety, and therefore was discharged by his employer.
Held, recovery allowed. Following the ruling of the California state court,
the Federal Court held that there was a violation of the plaintiff's right of
privacy. Mau v. Rio Grande Oil Inc., 28 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Calif. 1939).
The principal case based its decision on the holding in Melvin v. Reid, 112
Calif. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1932). In Melvin v. Reid, plaintiff was a woman
whose private life was made the subject of a moving picture. The court recognized a right of privacy in the clause of the State Constitution which guaranteed a right to "obtain and pursue happiness." A Georgia court declared the
right of privacy a natural right protected by the due process clause in its State
Constitution. Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50
S.E. 68, 69 L.R.A. 101, 106 Am. St. Rep. 104, 2 Ann. Cas. 561 (1905). However, such constitutional grounds as a basis for the right of privacy are unsound
and have been severely criticized, (1931) 20 CALnF. L. Rxv. 100; (1931) 20 Ky.

L. J. 184.
The right of privacy was unknown to the common law four decades ago,
and most jurisdictions now refuse to recognize the right, basing their decisions
on the lack of precedent. Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538,
64 N.E. 442, 59 L.R.A. 478, 89 Am. St. Rep. 828 (1902); Henry v. Cherry, 30
RI. 13, 73 AtI. 97 (1909).
Many courts have given a quasi-recognition to the right of privacy, but have
sought more settled principles on which to base their decisions. One court mentioned the right of privacy where there was an unauthorized use of plaintiff's
name, but based its decision on the property right in the name. Edison v. Edison
Polyform Mfg. Co., 73 NJ. Eq. 136, 67 Atl. 392 (1907). Where a photograph
was used without consent, recovery was based on the breach of an implied contract that the pictures were not to be used. Bennett v. Gusdorf, 101 Mont. 39, 53
P. (2d) 91 (1936). Similarly where an insane asylum caused noise and annoyance to those living near by, the court said there was an invasion of plaintiff's
privacy, but based its decision on the nuisance theory. Pritchett v. Bd. of
Corm., 42 Ind. App. 3, 85 N.E. 32 (1908). Recovery was based on a breach
of trust where the defendant took pictures of a malformed set of twins and
then copyrighted the pictures against his assurance that such would not be
done. Douglass v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912). "Protection of a
personal right" was the basis where pictures were put in the rogue's gallery of
persons who were not convicted. Schulman v. Whitaker, 117 La. 704, 42 So. 227
(1906) ; Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 117 La. 708, 42 So. 228 (1906).
After the courts denied the right of privacy in Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., supra, the New York legislature established the right by statute.
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N. Y. C=vi RIGHTS LAW (1909) §§ 50, 51. It established a right of privacy, so
far as the use of a person's name, portrait or picture is concerned, "for advertising purposes or for purposes of trade," unless written consent to such use
be obtained. News films were held not to be within the meaning of the statute.
Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 App. Div. 467, 178 N.Y. Supp. 752
(1919). Nor did the statute apply to newspapers when not in advertisments or
for purposes of trade, but for the dissemination of information. Jefferies v.
N. Y. Eve. Journal Pub. Co., 67 Misc. Rep. 570, 124 N.Y. Supp. 780 (1910).
The right of privacy perhaps has been recognized most frequently in connection with the unauthorized use of photographs or pictures in advertisements
or other publicly printed matter. Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532,
L.R.A. 1918D 1151 (1918); Flake v. Greensboro News Co., 212 N.C. 780, 195
S.E. 55 (1938); Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra. However, a person in public life or one who becomes involved in an occurrence of
public or general interest can not claim such a right. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky.
765, 299 S.W. 967, 55 A.L.R. 964 (1922) ; ParantountPictures v. Leader Press,
24 F. Supp. 1004 (W.D. Okla. 1938). The right of privacy also has been recognized where a stateroom was unreasonably broken into. Byfield v. Chandler, 33
Ga. App. 275, 125 S.E. 905 (1925). Tapping telephone wires has been held a
violation of the privacy of one's home. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 765, 37 S.W.
(2d) 46 (1931). The right has been extended to parents of deceased malformed
children whose pictures have been taken without authority. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 357, 155 S.E. 194 (1930).
The principal case extends to radio broadcasts the protection which the
California courts previously had accorded to the right not to have one's life
pictured on the screen. Melvin v. Reid, supra.
JOHN A. CALLAHAN.

